Quashing of Charge Sheet by High Court & Supreme Court

Introduction

A charge sheet is a document prepared by the investigating agency or the police containing the details of the crime or charges against an accused, gathered by it during investigation. The report entails all the records right from the onset of investigation on filing of FIR till the completion of it when the final report is prepared and submitted. All the procedure relating to charge sheet is laid down under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). 

The Charge Sheet comprises the name of the persons accused, the nature of information, names of those who appear to be acquainted with the facts of the case, whether any offence appears to be committed, whether the accused has been arrested, whether he has been released on a bond, whether he has been forwarded in custody under Section 170 CrPC. The offences alleged to have been committed by the accused are listed and described in the charge sheet, so that on its submission in court, proceedings against the accused can commence.

Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code saves the inherent powers of the High Court wherein it can pass any order to secure the ends of justice or to give effect to any order passed under the Criminal Procedure Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court. These powers of the High Court can be invoked to quash any criminal proceeding against the accused. Whether a criminal proceeding/FIR or charge sheet are to be quashed- is determined by the court on the basis of the following factors:

• That in the exercise of its jurisdiction under the Section, the court is required to examine whether the averments in the compliant or the charges framed constitute the essential ingredients of an offence alleged under the Indian Penal Code or when the charge sheet on the face of it does not make any offence.
• When there is lack of competency or jurisdiction of the trial court to try the case or there is a specific bar on the taking of cognizance.

There are some other grounds that have been elucidated through a catena of judgements by the apex court, some of which are reproduced hereinbelow:

In the case of Nagawwa v. V.S. Konjalgi[1] the hon’ble Supreme Court held that in the following cases the order of a Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside:

• where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;
• where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
• where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
• where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.

This provision reinstates that justice is paramount and that a litigant should not indulge in venting out its animosity or vindictiveness through a formal legal procedure against a person who may actually be innocent.

At the same time the Courts are cautious and with very great care consider all circumstances of the case before quashing a complaint or charge sheet.

Many times the Hon’ble courts do not quash the charge sheet but under peculiar circumstances direct the investigating agencies to further investigate the matter or even direct the accused to file discharge application before the court below and till such decision is taken the accused may remain on bail (this depends on the discretion of the trial court). In many cases, the Hon’ble HIgh Courts direct the trial court to consider the bail applications of the accused on the same day.

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[1] (1976) 3 SCC 736